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TRANSPORTATION STRIKE CONTROL
LEGISLATION: A CONGRESSIONAL
CHALLENGE
Arthur M. Wisehart•
Banquo's ghost, the problem of transportation strikes has
haunted Congress with unsettling regularity in recent years.
The persistence of this troublesome specter was poignantly pictured
by Congressman Staggers in his introduction to the hearings on the
1967 railroad shopcraft dispute:
IKE

L

As I was going up the stair
I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today.
Oh, how I wish he'd go away.1

This "blood-bolter'd Banquo" has "smiled upon" Congress three
times within the past five years. In each case the visitation took the
form of a dispute arising under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).2 In
1963, it was the railroad work rules dispute; in 1966, the five-carrier
airline strike; and in 1967, the railroad shopcraft dispute.
In each case Congress has reacted with obvious distaste and has
achieved little. Advocates of permanent reform, unable even to secure hearings on the subject during nonemergency periods, 3 have
been brushed aside in the atmosphere of urgency surrounding each
successive transportation crisis with the admonition that stopgap
measures must receive top priority.4' The result of months of legislative activity has been only ad hoc measures for arbitration of the
• Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1950, Miami University; M.P.A. 1953, Wayne
University; J.D. 1954, University of Michigan. Mr. Wisehart is Corporate Secretary
and Assistant General Counsel of American Airlines, Inc.-Ed. The views stated in this
Article are those of the author and are not attributable to American Airlines.
I. Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 559 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90, pt. 7, at 1 (1967).
2. 45 u.s.c. §§ 151-88 (1964).
3. See S. REP. No. 292, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967) (statement of Senator Javits);
ll3 CoNG. REc. 7215 (daily ed. June 14, 1967) (remarks of Congressman Pickle). Senator
Javits also expressed his frustration in 113 CONG. REc. 6099 (daily ed. May 1, 1967).
More recently, however, hearings on S. 176 were scheduled by the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery (Senator Tydings, Chairman)
for Oct. 17-19, 1967. S. 176, introduced by Senator Smathers on Jan. 11, 1967, would
establish a five-member court of Labor-Management Relations which could make final
determinations in disputes which adversely affect "the public interest of the Nation
to a substantial degree."
4. This has been called the "band aid" approach to labor crises. Statement of
Congressman Pickle before the Aeronautics Committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, May 17, 1967, at 3. On February 16, 1967, Congressman Pickle
introduced H.R. 5638 which would provide for permanent procedures which are somewhat similar to Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122 (1967).
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1963 and 1967 railroad disputes,!• Increasing public sentiment in
favor of permanent reform6 and a presidential request7 for corrective
legislation following the New York City transit strike have apparently gone unheeded. 8
With the recurrence of such situations, it is apparent that we are
faced with a failure of government in its most fundamental sense.
James Madison wrote: "A political system that does not provide for
a peaceable and authoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a government; the
object and end of a real government being the substitution of law
and order, for uncertainty, confusion, and violence." 9
The necessity of protecting the public interest in continuity of
transportation services while at the same time preserving the institution of collective bargaining presents a serious dilemma which the
statutory framework devised during the first third of this century
now seems inadequate to resolve. Indeed, most crippling strikes
have occurred after statutory mechanisms for dispute resolution have
been exhausted. This Article will trace the history of transportation
labor legislation, outline the shortcomings of present procedures
for dispute resolution, evaluate various alternatives for statutory
reform, and propose permanent corrective legislation which would
5. 77 Stat. 132 (1963); 81 Stat. 122 (1967).
6. A 1963 survey by the Opinion Research Corporation indicated that 60% of the
public favored compulsory arbitration of transportation strikes. A 1966 Gallup poll
on the same subject asked the following question: "If a strike continues for seven
days, with no agreement reached, would you favor or oppose the idea of a Government-appointed committee deciding the issue and compelling both sides to accept the
terms?" Of those polled, 54% were in favor, 36% were opposed, and 10% had no
opinion. U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD REPORT, Sept. 5, 1966, at 8. A more recent Gallup poll
used a slightly different question: "It has been suggested that no strike be permitted
to go on for more than 21 days. If after 21 days, the union and the employer cannot
reach an agreement, the courts would appoint a committee that would decide the
issue and both would be compelled to accept the terms. Would you favor or oppose
this idea?" Of those responding, 68% were in favor, 22% opposed, and 10% had no
opinion. World Journal Tribune, April 26, 1967, p. 7, col. 1.
7. President's State of the Union Message, N.Y. Times, Jan. IZ, 1966, at 14, col. 3:
"I also intend to ask the Congress to consider measures which, without improperly
invading state and local authority, will enable us to effectively deal with strikes which
threaten irreparable damage to the national interest."
8. Recently Senator Mansfield, the Senate Democratic Leader, reported that the
President had referred the matter back to Congress. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1967, at 20,
col. 3.
9. THE COMPLETE MADISON 153 (Padover ed. 1953).
In a lecture last year, Professor Arthur Goodhart, now Scholar-in-Residence of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, singled out strikes as one of the
most serious problems facing the development of the law at the present time. Professor Goodhart does not regard the outlook as hopeless, however; he predicts that in
time the present inadequate procedures for dealing with strikes will seem as outlandish
as procedures in the thirteenth century now appear. Address by Arthur L. Goodhart
to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Jan. 18, 1966.
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a.void the necessity of submitting each dispute for congressional
resolution on an ad hoc basis.
l.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The evolution of labor relations in the major transportation
industries has been characterized by an increased reliance on the
institution of collective bargaining. When an accumulation of
employee complaints and grievances caused a breakdown in transportation services, the parties were told to bargain collectively. When
they refused to do so voluntarily, a duty to bargain was imposed by
law. To protect the integrity of the bargaining process, other compulsions were legislated: prohibition of employer interference with
unions, and compulsory third-party determination of disputes involving selection of a bargaining agent. To safeguard the fruits of
bargaining, collective bargaining agreements were made enforceable
at law, and when grievances still resulted in strikes, third-party
determination was made compulsory.
In "major" disputes involving the formation of new contracts,
the statutory requirements for notice of change, conferences, status
quo and cooling-off periods, and mediation were added to give
collective bargaining the greatest opportunity to function effectively.
Labor and management, aware of the strong public interest in preventing transportation strikes, agreed upon a final backstop: if the
parties were unable to settle after following all of the procedures
designed to safeguard collective bargaining, a presidential emergency
board would be created to inquire into the dispute, find out who
was at fault, and recommend a settlement. Acceptance of the settlement was to be virtually compulsory (1) because of the moral commitments by labor and management in agreeing to the legislation
in the first place, and (2) because of the supposedly coercive effect of
public opinion. The failure of this procedure to function as originally intended has contributed significantly to the recurrence of
major transportation strikes.

A. Weaknesses of the Early Statutes
The earliest railway labor legislation, enacted in 1888, followed
a decade of labor strife.10 This statute, which authorized voluntary
10. 25 Stat. 501 (1888). The Act followed one year after passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). The strikes of that period are reviewed in detail
in G. EGGERT, RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES: THE BEGINNINGS OF FEDERAL STRIKE PoUCY
(1967).
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arbitration and investigations by ad hoc commissions, was little
used11 and was replaced ten years later by the Erdman Act,12 which
permitted mediation and voluntary arbitration. The Newlands
Act, 13 enacted in 1913 in response to a dispute involving Eastern
trainmen and conductors,14 established a permanent Board of Mediation and Conciliation which was authorized to intervene in railway disputes on its own initiative. The Act specified that an arbitration award was to be confined to "questions specifically submitted
or [to] matters directly bearing thereon." But procedures for interpreting mediated agreements and arbitration awards were rudimentary in form, and unions complained that management had assumed
the prerogative of interpreting them.111 Although the Newlands Act
remained in effect until superseded by the Transportation Act of
1920, two significant developments intervened which decreased its
practical importance: the enactment of the Adamson Act in 1916,
and federal seizure and operation of the railroads during World
War I.
The Adamson Act16 was an experiment in the use of congressional power "to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between the
parties"17 by legislatively fixing the terms of settlement in a particular labor controversy. The Act, which Congress consciously designed
to favor the unions directly involved in the dispute, was criticized as
a capitulation to the demands of labor and as a submission to expediency.18 President Wilson would have preferred arbitrationwhich the railroads had offered to accept-and so stated: "I yield to
no man in firm adherence, alike of conviction and purpose, to the
principle of arbitration in industrial disputes . . . ." 19 Other railway unions wanted to share in the concessions granted, 20 and the
labor unrest resulting from the Adamson Act contributed to government seizure of the railroads within a few months after American
entry into World War I.
11. See L. LECHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 16 (1955).
12. 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
13. 38 Stat. 103 (1913).
14. See L. LEcHT, supra note 11, at 25.
15. ADMINISTR.A.TION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR Ac:r BY THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoAIU>,
19!14-1957, at 80 (1958).
16. 39 Stat. 721 (1916).
17. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 351 (1917).
18. See E. BERMAN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1924),
reprinted for the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., in Library of Congress LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
Federal Legislation To End Strikes: A Documentary History (pt. I) 63, 77 (1967).
19. E. BERMAN, supra note 18, at 72.
20. See w. HINES, WAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 18 (1928).
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Railway unions were generally enthusiastic about the results of
government operation.21 During the period of seizure, national
agreements were established, adjustment boards were created for
grievances, pay rates went up, and union representation increased.
From other points of view, however, the results were less desirable.
One Senator recently commented that government operation of the
railroads created "the most tangled mess that could possibly be imagined."22 His investigations revealed that thirty years after the date
of seizure a sizeable government office was still engaged in trying
to unravel the legal intricacies of government operation and the
numerous damage suits which followed. 23 Moreover, the most troublesome labor disputes during the decade following restoration to private operation by the Transportation Act of 192024 were inherited
from the period of government control.
The Transportation Act of 1920 contained its own labor relations
provisions which virtually supplanted the Newlands Act. The 1920
statute relied primarily upon determinations by a Railroad Labor
Board comprised of three management representatives, three labor
representatives, and three public representatives. The Board's effectiveness, however, was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's
narrow interpretations of its authority. The Court held that the
Board was intended to act as an arbitral agency whose decisions
were enforceable only by public opinion,25 and that the statute did
not require the railroads to recognize or deal with labor unions. 26
The Court later ruled that Congress had not intended to forbid
activities whose prohibition would be taken for granted today: refusal to confer or bargain, interference with organizational activities, refusal to comply with a Railroad Labor Board election, and
coercion or discrimination against employees because of union membership.27 Other causes of dissatisfaction developed, and the unions
eventually boycotted the Railroad Labor Board.28
Thus, prior to the passage of the RLA, peaceful settlement of
transportation labor controversies was hampered by weak statutes
affording few alternatives to the strike for resolution of disputes.
The Newlands Act had provided for mediation, and the Transportation Act of 1920 included a procedure for compulsory fact-finding;
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 37.
113 CONG. REc. 7806 (daily ed. June 7, 1967) (statement of Senator Holland).
Id.
41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920).
Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 80 (1923).
261 U.S. at 85.
Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925).
See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 43.
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but an enforceable duty to bargain, third-party determination of
disputes involving bargaining units and representatives, a prohibition against interference by employers, status quo periods, procedures for enforcement of bargaining agreements, and mandatory
grievance arbitration had not been incorporated in any of the
early statutes.29 These shortcomings and the practical ineffectiveness
of the Transportation Act highlighted the need for congressional
action.
B. Experience Under the RLA

The labor relations of the railroads (and of the airlines since
1936) have been governed by the RLA,30 which was passed in 1926
29. A comparison of the various pieces of legislation is set out below:
COMPARISON

Provisions outlawing
blacklisting, yellow-dog
contracts, and anti-union
discrimination
Enforceable duty to
bargairt
Noninterference with
choice of bargaining
representative
Designation of bargaining
representative
Determination of
bargaining unit
Mediation
Compulsory fact-finding
Status quo periods
Enforcement of bargaining
agreements; grievance
arbitration
Arbitration of terms of
new contracts

OF

RAILROAD LABOR LAWS
Railway
Labor
Act
(1926,
as
amended in
1934)

Act of
1888

Erdman
Act
(1898)

Newlands
Act
(1913)

No

Noa

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Nob

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No
No
Yes
No

No
Yes
No
Limited

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No

No

No

Voluntary

Voluntary

Voluntary

No
Noc
Yes
No
Nonenforceable determinations
Nonenforceable determinations

Transportation Act
(1920)

Yes
Voluntary

a Provisions outlawing blacklists and yellow-dog contracts were held unconstitutional in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
b See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923).
c The Board of Mediation and Conciliation established under the Newlands Act
was still in existence.
30. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
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after months of intensive negotiations resulted in an agreement between representatives of labor and management.31 To "insure to the
public continuity and efficiency of interstate transportation service,"32 the RLA relied upon the parties' sense of moral obligation
and the ostensibly coercive effect of public opinion rather than
upon enforceable obligations. Since the bill was the product of an
agreement between labor and management,33 it was assumed that
the parties would be under a "moral obligation to see that their
agreement accomplishes its purpose."34 If a sense of moral obligation proved insufficient, the backers of the RLA expected that public
opinion would force the parties to accept the recommendations of
a presidential emergency board appointed to report the situation
to the public.35 A union spokesman commented that if the parties
"stand out for unreasonable conditions, if they take an unreasonable
or unfair position, and that blocks the settlement . . . then this
board, with all its power and prestige, can go to the public and
crystallize public opinion against the parties responsible for not
maintaining peace,"36
The RLA has been instrumental in preventing certain kinds of
labor disputes from developing into strikes.

I. Interference with the Bargaining Representative
Before the passage of the RLA, direct employer interference with
unions led to many railroad strikes.37 Management sidetracked the
31. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 80-91 (1915). Mr.
Donald A. Richberg, labor's representative in drafting the Railway Labor Act (RLA),
has written in retrospect:
The fight for the Railway Labor Act, which was inaugurated in 1923, was one
of the most critical battles over labor legislation ever waged in Congress. At the
time such fundamental questions as the right of labor to organize, to be recognized by management, to engage in collective bargaining, and to establish trade
agreements binding throughout a trade or industry were all bitterly in dispute.
The country had just experienced the first and only nationwide strike of railroad
employees, and tremendous public antagonism and much fear of any increased
power in organized labor had been aroused. The American people were just
coming out of the first post-war depression and in no mood to be tolerant of
labor disputes which interrupted production or distribution. Indeed, the strongest
argument which the railroad employees had was that they were voluntarily making proposals designed for the unusual purpose of preventing, rather than abetting
strikes.
D. RICHBERG, LABOR UNION MONOPOLY 17-18 (1957).
32. H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926). See also 44 Stat. 577 (1926),
45 U.S.C. § 15l(a) (1964) for a statement of the Act's purpose.
33. Hearings on S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess, 37 (1926).
3·i. Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1926).
85. Hearings, supra note 34, at 18. See also 22 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 18 (1956); 17
N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951).
86. Hearings, supra note 34, at 19.
87. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203 (1925); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923).
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Railroad Labor Board's established election procedures by conducting
its mm elections; votes for the union were not counted, and only
ballots cast for individual employees were considered valid. As a
result, often on the strength of a minority of votes cast, the railroads
recognized individuals as bargaining representatives, paid their salaries and expenses, and negotiated agreements with them. The consequence was frequently a strike. Yet, as has been noted, the Supreme
Court had held that the Transportation Act did not prohibit this
kind of direct interference with union representation.38
The RLA removed such activities by management as a source of
friction. Upholding an injunction against a railroad, the Supreme
Court in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks8 9 accepted the union's argument that
"the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor
Act was 'to provide a machinery to prevent strikes.' " 40 Although the
RLA looked toward "amicable adjustments," the Court insisted that
"freedom of choice in the selection of representatives on each side
of the dispute is the essential foundation of the statutory scheme.'' 41

2. Refusal To Bargain
None of the prior statutes had imposed a duty to bargain, and
even the requirement in section 30 I of the Transportation Act42 that
the parties confer was held unenforceable by the Court.43 However,
in Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation No. 40, 44 the
Court decided that the RLA (as amended in 1934)45 placed an affirmative, enforceable duty upon carriers to recognize and deal with
unions in collective bargaining. With this development, another
source of strikes was eliminated. As Justice Douglas stated in an
excellent analysis of the legislative development: "Thus what had
long been a 'right' of employees enforceable only by strikes and
other methods of industrial warfare emerged as a 'right' enforceable
38. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
39. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
40. 281 U.S. at 565.
41. 281 U.S. at 569.
42. 41 Stat. 469 (1920).
43. 281 U.S. at 565.
44. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
45. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934). Among the amendments was a provision correcting a deficiency which troubled (but did not deter) the Court in Texas tr New Orleans Railroad: the absence of a statutory penalty for intereference. Section 2, 10th, making it a
crime to interfere with bargaining representatives, was added in 1934. 48 Stat. 1189
(1934), 45 u.s.c. § 152, 10th (1964).
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by judicial decree. The right of collective bargaining was no longer
dependent on economic power alone." 46
3. Selection of a Bargaining Representative

Prior to passage of the RLA, carriers were permitted to deal with
company unions representing only a minority of the employees,47
but the resulting disputes stymied bargaining and led to numerous
strikes. Under the RLA, railroads were no longer free to interfere
with employee organization.48 However, the original version of the
RLA contained no enforceable procedures for determining who the
bargaining representative would be. To fill this void, the 1934
amendments created the National Mediation Board.49 Section 2, 9th,
of the amended act was aimed specifically at the practice of refusing
to recognize employee-elected representatives while maintaining
company unions. It provided a means for ascertaining the employee
representatives through intervention and certification by the Mediation Board and required the carriers to deal with the bargaining
agent so certified. 50 The 1934 amendments also gave the National
Mediation Board responsibility for determining the proper "craft
or class" of employees for bargaining purposes51-a question which
had been another cause of strikes. These determinations have been
held to be virtually immune from judicial review. 52

4. Grievances
The RLA, like the Transportation Act of 1920, provided for the
establishment of adjustment boards for grievances. Resort to these
boards originally depended upon voluntary agreement, and "minor" disputes involving grievances and issues of contract interpretation and application continued to be a serious source of friction. 53
In 1934, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation reported to
Congress that "[g]rievances on a number of roads in the past few
years have accumulated to such an extent that the only remedy the
46. General Comm. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 330 (1943).
47. Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925).
48. Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 557 (1930).
49. 45 U.S.C. § 152, 9th (1964). 48 Stat. 1185 (1934).
50. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545-46 (1937).
51. 45 u.s.c. § 152, 9th (1964).
52. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of NonContract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965); Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297
(1943).
53. See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 74-75.
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m~n could see was to threaten a strike and thus secure appointment
by the President of a fact finding board which could go into the
whole situation." 54 To solve this problem, the 1934 amendments
changed the adjustment board provisions into a form of compulsory
arbitration later characterized by the Supreme Court as a "reasonable alternative" to economic warfare. 55 Other deficiencies of adjustment board procedures became apparent, and in 1966 Congress
acted56 to expedite adjustment board determinations and give them
greater binding effect.57 As a result, another cause of work stoppages
was eliminated.

C. Shortcomings of the RLA: Formation of
New Agreements
Strikes during the formation of new agreements are to be averted
under the RLA by imposition of an enforceable duty to bargain,
noninterference with the bargaining agent, mediation services, cooling-off periods, and possible appointment of a presidential emergency
board, A detailed dispute resolution mechanism is provided: notice
of an intent to change the contract terms is to be given by one or
both of the parties followed by direct negotiations, mediation by
the National Mediation Board, a proffer of voluntary arbitration, a
thirty-day cooling-off period, and if a strike threat results in the
appointment of a presidential emergency board, a report by the board
and another thirty-day cooling-off period. During this process, the
existing terms of employment must be maintained58 and resort to
"self-help" is prohibited.59 Once these procedures have been completed, however, the parties are free to engage in economic warfare. 60
It is at this point that the RLA has too often failed to accomplish its
stated objectives.
Early experience under the RLA was favorable, however, and
almost invariably both parties accepted the emergency board recommendations as the basis for dispute settlement. 61 In an eight-year
54. Hearings on H.R. 9861 Before the House Rules Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25
(1934).
55. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &: Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S.
30, 41 (1957). The legislative history is also discussed in Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360
U.S. 601, 608-16 (1959).
56. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. II 1965-1966).
57. See Note, Adjusting the Adjustment Board: Jurisdictional and Judicial Review
Amendments to Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, 42 !ND. L.J. 109 (1966).
58. Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
817 (1964).
59. Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. &: S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
60. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. B. &: 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
61. See 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 32 (1951).
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period following the passage of the RLA, there were only three inconsequential railroad strikes.62 Apparently on the assumption that
transportation strikes had become outmoded, the RLA was extended
in 1936 to include the airlines. 63 However, with the railroad wage
movements of 1941 the pattern changed dramatically. It has since
become customary for the unions to reject emergency board recommendations, using them instead only as a basis "for securing further
wage and rule concessions in a final settlement, usually made under
Executive auspices." 64 As one commentator explained: "The award
. . . serves as a baseline measuring the minimum changes to be incorporated in the new contract. Employee organizations have sought
to extend their gain through further negotiations in which the carriers may also offer additional counter proposals." 65
Many commentators have become concerned that automatic rejection of emergency board recommendations by unions is the principal reason that this procedure has not had its intended effect in recent
years. 66 One labor historian observed that "the significant collective
bargaining development has usually occurred after the report was
issued and found unacceptable. The unions have been the active
group in rejecting board reports." 67 In the airline industry, for instance, there have been thirty-three emergency boards, most of which
made specific recommendations for the settlement of existing controversies over wages. One airline personnel vice president has commented that "[w]e can recall no instance in which the unions ever
accepted such a recommendation; in every case the carriers have
62. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 n.7 (1937).
COMPARISON OF MAN-DAYS LOST DUE TO STRIKES

Water Transportation
Motor Transportation
Railroads

1933

1934

1935

1936
CTan.-May)

32,752
155,565
0

1,068,867
859,657
0

749,534
202,393
56

119,820
46,054
0

63. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964). See Kahn, Settlement of Airline Labor Disputes, 37 PAPER OF THE MlCHIGAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ARTS
AND LETrERs 289 (1952) for an analysis of the airlines' early experience under the
Railway Labor Act. Later developments are covered in Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent
Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 22 (1960).
64. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951).
65. L. LEcHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 15 (1955). See also
KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 154-55 (1954); E. McNATT,
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY, 1947-1957, at 29 (1958).
66. See 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 32 (1951).
67. L. LEcHT, supra note 65, at 6 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
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been required to pay more than this independent agency has thought
proper to pay." 68
The three major transportation labor crises which have required
congressional attention in the past four years arose after the statutory
procedures for dealing with the formation of new contracts had been
completed. In each case, the dispute had been submitted to a presidential emergency board69 whose recommendations were accepted by
the carriers but rejected by the union or unions involved. After nonstatutory intervention of various types proved ineffective, each dispute required congressional attention for a protracted period.
In the two railroad disputes, ad hoc legislation was enacted70 to
end the strikes. In the airline strike, an ad hoc bill passed the Senate
but the dispute was settled before the House completed action. 71
Before the settlement was achieved, however, more than seventy
cities in the United States were deprived of all trunkline air service
for forty-three days, and 230 cities lost more than seventy per cent of
such service during the same period.72 The strike grounded millions
of would-be passengers,73 caused 135,000 employees (including
100,000 not involved in the dispute) to lose earnings,74 cost the
airline industry eighty-two million dollars in net income (the struck
carriers lost 103 million dollars), 75 and violated the presidential wage
guidelines, thus contributing to a series of inflationary settlements.76
Senator Morse, who chaired the presidential emergency board
which investigated and reported on the dispute, stated on the Senate
floor that employees of a regulated industry characterized by a high
degree of public investment should not be permitted to injure the
public interest by crippling air transportation:
68. Statement by Everett M. Goulard, Vice President, Industrial Relations, Pan
American World Airways, on behalf of American Airlines, Eastern Air Lines, National
Airlines, Pan American World Airways, and Trans World Airlines, before the Special
Committee on National Strikes in the Transportation Industries of the American Bar
Association, May 5, 1967, at 18 [hereinafter Goulard Statement]. Reasons for the failure
of emergency board recommendations in airline disputes are discussed in Kahn, supra
note 63, at 297-98.
69. Emergency Boards No. 154 (1963), No. 166 (1966), and No. 169 (1967).
70. 77 Stat. 132 (1963); 81 Stat. 122 (1967).
71. S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See Curtin, National Emergency Dis•
putes Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in the Transportation Industries, 55 GEo.
L.J. 786, 790 (1967).
72. See Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 186 Before the House Gomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 167 (1967).
73. See Goulard Statement 7.
74. Id.
75. See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE Anu.INE
INDUSTRY OF THE IAM STRIKE 2 (1967).
76. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 790.
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They should not be allowed to use their naked economic power to
force out of the carriers-and, not so indirectly, out of the taxpayers,
in the long run-a settlement in this case that will be highly inflationary in nature. Their action can be used as the bellwether for
additional inflationary settlements from the major industries that
are waiting in the wings to have their disputes settled.77

Among the major unions "waiting in the wings" were those representing the railroad workers. The International Association of
Machinists (JAM), the union which was responsible for the airline
strike, also made a railroad settlement impossible. Senator Morse
commented that "the irresponsible action of the machinists is having a deleterious effect upon the concept of collective bargaining and
may well be bringing all regulated industry closer to permanent
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration of their labor disputes."78
As damaging as the tactics of the JAM were to the public interest,
they should not have surprised students of collective bargaining.
The JAM has an obvious interest in retaining its position as bargaining representative and in acquiring new members. To accomplish
these objectives, a union must negotiate a settlement which is not
only fair, but one which its members believe to be as good as or
better than any other bargaining representative could have achieved.
The JAM's actions in the airline dispute were attributable at least
in part to a challenge from rival unions. 79 After negotiating a
spectacular settlement for its airline members, the JAM had to convince its railroad members that they were no less favored.
Public opinion has not functioned as originally planned in compelling acceptance of emergency board recommendations. Unions
have rejected those recommendations in hope of achieving higher
settlements, while management, subject to the pressures of being in
a regulated industry, has continued to accept them. These recommendations have thus become a one-sided form of arbitration: binding on management but not on labor; simply escalating the award
rather than settling the dispute.
77. 112 CONG. REC. 17,491 (1966).
78. 113 CONG. REc. S7791 (daily ed. June 7, 1967).
79. The Transport Workers Union represents employees of a number of airlines,
and within the last three years organizational efforts by the Teamsters and the Airline
Mechanics Fraternal Association have sought to dislodge International Association of
Machinists (IAM) representation. See Landauer, Teamsters and an &udacious Leader,
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1966, at 6, col. 3.
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Action must be taken to avoid frustration of the RLA's original
purpose-the avoidance of "any interruption to commerce or to the
operation of any carrier engaged therein." 80 I£ public opinion does
not have the expected coercive effect, something must be substituted
to secure acceptance of emergency board recommendations. Even
before the airline and railroad episodes described above, the National Mediation Board warned: "The present situation, if it continues, can result only in a complete breakdown of the machinery for
the settlement of wage and rules disputes which was so carefully
and hopefully constructed by the legislators and sponsors of the
Railway Labor Act in 1926." 81
As previously indicated, Congress has not hesitated to provide
a remedy when the purposes of the Railway Labor Act could not be
achieved through voluntary action. When "free" collective bargaining would not work, Congress made it compulsory; when carriers
would not stop interfering with unions, penalties were added; when
quarrels over the identity of the bargaining agent and the scope of
the bargaining unit blocked negotiations, Congress provided for
independent determination of such issues; and, when the parties
were unable to settle grievances, Congress provided for the mandatory resort to adjustment boards. Similar corrective action should
now be taken. 82 Several alternative courses of action which have
been suggested for dealing with the present situation are considered
below.
A. Maintain the Status Quo

One alternative would be to continue to rely on the force of
moral obligation and public pressure to enforce emergency board
recommendations. However, recent experience indicates that their
combined force is not strong enough to have the effect originally
intended. The National Mediation Board has suggested that "in
practice ... the varied and oftentimes technical issues involved in
such cases receive so little publicity, and are so difficult of understanding by the general public, that the effect anticipated when the
law was passed has been entirely lost." 83 Whatever the reason, public opinion has not played its anticipated coercive role with respect
80. 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964). Only recently the National
Mediation Board docketed a petition by the Airline Mechanics' Fraternal Association
to supplant the IAM on United Airlines.
81. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951).
82. See 19 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 7 (1953).
83. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951).
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to emergency board recommendations, and the original commitment
to a moral obligation appears to have been forgotten.
In any event, the assumption that the status quo is being preserved simply because the laws on the statute books remain the same
is far from realistic. Serious strike threats result in a great variety of
nonstatutory improvisation which may include White House mediation, implicit or overt threats of cancellation of government contracts, adverse determinations with respect to routes, fares, or future
contracts, punitive legislation, tax reviews, antitrust investigations,
the sale of stockpiled commodities on the open market, or the appointment of a nonstatutory board to make higher recommendations. 84 When such pressures succeed, the result is paradoxically
hailed as another triumph of "free" collective bargaining; success is
also advanced as another reason why statutory change is unnecessary.
In fact, such extra-statutory activity demonstrates that legislative
change is urgently needed. As in every form of governmental activity, public policy requires that intervention in labor disputes, when
essential, be a civilized exercise of power. The forms and procedures
employed when government is forced to intervene in labor disputes
must be such as to inspire public confidence in the fundamental
fairness of the government's action.
As the railroad and airline disputes illustrate, intervention outside
the present statutory framework has usually taken the form of ad hoc
legislation when all other forms of improvisation have failed. Advocates of this approach argue that such legislation can be tailored
to fit the particular controversy, and that the lack of control over
the content of a legislated settlement will impel the parties to bar84. See Sloane, National Emergency Strikes: The Danger of Extralegal Success,
BusINESs HORIZONS, Summer 1967, at 91. In the railroad shopcraft dispute, Emergency
Board No. 169 (1967) made recommendations for a settlement which the railroads
accepted but the unions rejected. The subsequent nonstatutory Fahy Board recommended a settlement more favorable to labor. See History of the Railroad Shopcraft
Dispute in Hearings on S.J. Res. 81 Before the Subcomm. on Labor and· Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 441-43 (1967). It took little imagination to foresee that the
Special Board established under Pub. L. 90-54 [81 Stat. 122 (1967)] would add even more
sweeteners. See Raskin, That "Slave Labor Law" Twenty Years Later, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1967, at 30, col. 5. In its final determination, the Special Board adopted the Fahy
Board's recommendations for the eighteen months covered thereby and added a five
per cent increase and a five cent skill differential for an additional six months. The
Report of the Special Board, Senator Morse's explanatory statement, and the critical
individual statement of Board Member Frederick R. Kappel are set forth in 113
CONG. REc. 13,077-82 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1967).
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, Presidential boards are forbidden to make recommendations on the merits. But the President is completely free to appoint nonstatutory boards at will, which are subject to no such limitation. An example is the Morse
board appointed by President Kennedy in connection with the 1963 East Coast longshoretnen's strike.
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gain.85 There are, however, a number of serious disadvantages to
this approach. 86 A legislative solution to each serious dispute cons1:1mes a great deal of congressional time and attention. Congress
is not designed to rule in individual cases; such functions are more
sensibly delegated to administrative agencies better equipped to
tailor their actions to particular situations. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage is that, as the railroad and airline controversies demonstrate, ad hoc legislative efforts tend to stifle collective bargaining.

B. End Government Intervention
It has been proposed that all government intervention be eliminated, with a reversion to a laissez-faire system in which dispute resolution depends solely upon the parties' economic muscle. 87 But
it is clear that government intervention in one form or another is
inevitable when a labor dispute threatens the general welfare of any
segment of society. Government cannot sit idly by when the nation's
rail or air transportation is disrupted, when New York City's subways are shut dmvn, or even when a needed hospital is closed.
Every aspect of collective bargaining as we know it rests upon
some form of government intervention. By imposing a duty to recognize unions, deal with them fairly, and bargain in good faith,
"government intervention" provides the equality of power upon
which collective bargaining depends. Government is also responsible
for protecting arbitration, making mediation available, and determining the proper representatives in jurisdictional disputes. It seems
obvious that some form of governmental intervention will persist
in virtually all labor disputes. The questions in each case must be
(I) whether such intervention is fair, (2) whether it takes a form
approved by our society, and (3) whether it is effective. Governmental
intervention in serious transportation strikes has too often failed
on all three counts.
C. Include the Airlines and Railroads Under the Taft-Hartley Act88
Another frequently suggested change is that the airlines and
railroads be brought under the Taft-Hartley Act. 89 Some forms of
85. See Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in AMERICAN AssEMBLY,
CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 168, 177-78 (1967).
86. The clumsiness of ad hoc legislation for dealing with an individual situation
is exemplified by the Adamson Act, discussed in text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
87. See H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
LAnoR DISPUTES 211 (1966). See also U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining,
NATION'S BUSINESS, March 1962, at 38 (interview with Mr. David L. Cole).
88. 29 u.s.c. §§ 141-87 (1964).
89. See Fleming, Collective Bargaining Revisited, a paper presented to the Labor
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transportation-notably the trucking and maritime industries-are
already subject to Taft-Hartley coverage, but their experience hardly
suggests that the airlines and railroads should also be included.90
From the standpoint of transportation, the Taft-Hartley Act
offers few advantages and contains some positive disadvantages:
grievance disputes can still be a source of strikes; 91 status quo and
cooling-off periods are not as widely available; mediation has less
power and flexibility; and there is no requirement that unions be
organized on a system-wide basis. Moreover, the fact that presidential
boards have no power to make recommendations on the merits of
disputes has been long criticized as a defect.92 The RLA, on the other
hand, was developed solely as a transportation measure and it has
been successful in narrowing the causes of economic warfare. The
only remaining difficulty with the RLA is how to handle "major"
disputes after the statutory procedures have failed, and this problem
also exists under the Taft-Hartley Act.

D. Seizure
Seizure is frequently advocated by unions for an obvious reason:
the history of governmental seizure as a means of settling labor disputes indicates that after seizure the workers have usually been given
some or all of the benefits which they could not get from their employer.93 When the strike emergency has ended and the business is
returned to private management, management in effect has been
required to accept a settlement it would not otherwise have accepted.9¼
The chief disadvantage of seizure is that it does nothing to resolve
a dispute unless it is accompanied by an executive decree fixing the
terms of employment. However, the issuance of such a decree is
tantamount to compulsory arbitration of the worst kind. Moreover,
Management Institute of the American Arbitration Association, Nov. 1966, at 23. Cf.
Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlement, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1967: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTE£NTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 185, 200 (1967).
90. Nine of the twenty-six Presidential Boards of Inquiry appointed under the
Taft-Hartley Act have involved maritime disputes. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Emergency Disputes Under the Taft-Hartley Act, reprinted for the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public '\\Telfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATION
To END STRIKES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, pt. I, at 575 (Comm. Print 1967).
91. E.g., see Sinclair Refinery Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
92. See Seidman, National Emergency Strike Legislation, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR
RELATIONS LAW 473, 478, 491 (1961).
93. See Hearings, supra note 84, at 136 (statement of G. E. Leighty, Chairman,
Railway Labor Executives Association).
94. See FEDERAL LEGISLATION To END STRIKES, mpra note 90, at 379.

1714

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:1697

unless the demands of the union are met, the effectiveness of seizure
in controlling strikes is questionable. 95 Government operation in
New York City and elsewhere has been no guarantee against strikes.
The heavy administrative burden which seizure places on the government and the lengthy legal proceedings which are likely to
result96 are other disadvantages. Therefore, an expedient so alien to
our economic system does not seem to be a supportable alternative.
E. Compulsory Arbitration
It is perhaps too much to hope for objective consideration of
compulsory arbitration. The subject has frequently been treated as
one for unsophisticated argument; 97 discussion tends to proceed in
simplistic "pro" and "con" terms. The emotional overtones carried
by the word "compulsory" further obstruct careful analysis. We
should not, however, allow our attention to be diverted by this epithet. As demonstrated earlier, other once-controversial forms of
compulsion are incorporated in the RLA and are now accepted as a
matter of course.
Compulsory arbitration is the subject of many common beliefs
which either have no application to transportation enterprises or are
of doubtful -validity. One such belief is that compulsory arbitration
will not be effective in controlling strikes. Grievance and contract
interpretation disputes have already been subjected to compulsory
arbitration, however, and strikes are no longer a problem in these
areas. 98 Third-party determination has also been effective in preventing jurisdictional disputes and controversies over the choice of
bargaining representatives from developing into strikes. Finally, ad
hoc congressional provisions for compulsory arbitration ended the
national railroad strikes in 1963 and 1967. Whether compulsory
arbitration would be effective in preventing strikes if used regularly in other "major" disputes would depend upon the fairness and
neutrality of the procedures employed. But the use of compulsory
arbitration in proper cases could provide a constructive device to
enable workers in vital public service industries to achieve wage
95. "Between 1945 and 1953 seizure proved ineffective to prevent a stoppage on
numerous occasions." Cox, Seizure in Emergency Disputes, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND
NATIONAL Poucy 227 (1955). See also Katz, Emergency Dispute Settlement, in LAnoR
LAw DEVELOPMENTS 1967, at 223, 237.
96. See statement of Senator Holland in text accompanying note 22 supra.
97. See "The Pros and Cons of Compulsory Arbitration" published in 1965 by
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as a high school debate manual.
98. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River 8: Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957).
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equality without having to resort to strikes endangering public
health and safety.o0
Compulsory arbitration has been used extensively in Australia
and New Zealand. While it has not eliminated strikes in those countries, it seems to have reduced their impact. In testimony before a
Senate subcommittee, Samuel J. Rosenman stated on the basis of his
visits with labor union leaders in Australia, that "[t]he arguments
usually advanced in this country against any form of compulsory arbitration were dismissed by them as contrary to their experience with
labor courts." 10° Closer to home, compulsory arbitration for public
utilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania has either eliminated strikes
or materially reduced them. 101 Thus, the evidence seems to indicate
that compulsory arbitration has been at least partially effective in
controlling strikes.
Although some believe that compulsory arbitration would lead
to price control, government control of transportation "prices" has
existed since 1887. Even as to unregulated industries, the assertion
that compulsory arbitration would lead to price fixing is too categorical.102
A third myth is that compulsory arbitration would interfere
with the collective bargaining process. It is sometimes argued that
under compulsory arbitration the parties might tend to slight the
bargaining process in order to present their &trongest positions to
the arbitrator. However, the experience in Australia and New Zealand indicates that compulsory arbitration has not destroyed collective bargaining. In New Zealand, for instance, the Secretary of
Labour has estimated that 80 per cent of the disputes subject to
arbitration are settled by bargaining.103 In the United States, com99. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1966, at 9, col. 3.
100. Statement by Samuel I. Rosenman in Hearings on S. 176 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., 26-27 (1967); Sykes, Labor Arbitration in Australia, 13 AM. J. COMP. L.
216, 248 (1964). The Goulard Statement, at 20, indicates that the figures for man-days
lost due to strikes per 1,000 employees in New Zealand and Australia were 72 and 191,
respectively, compared with 318 for the United States.
101. R. FRANCE&: R. LESTER, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF UTILITY DISPUTES IN NEW
JERSEY ,\ND PENNSYLVANIA 83 (1951). Soon after this study the Supreme Court held that
such statutes were pre-empted by federal law to the extent that interstate commerce is
affected [Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951)],
and, as a result, they have fallen into disuse.
102. See Williams, Settlement of Labor Disputes in Industries Affected with a
National Interest, 49 A.B.A.J. 862, 868 (1963).
103. N. S. Woods, The Practical Working of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration System (unpublished paper). See also Tyndall, The New Zealand System of
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, 82 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REvmw 138, 144
(1960).
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pulsory arbitration under the RLA of "minor" disputes involving
the airlines and railroads has not precluded settlement of the vast
majority of those disputes before reaching the arbitration stage.
Many employers and unions under the Taft-Hartley Act provide
by agreement for arbitration of grievances; and, while it may be
of little relevance to the settlement of "major" disputes involving
formation of new contracts, most grievance and "minor disputes"
are settled short of arbitration.104
Of more relevance, Pan American World Ainvays and five unions
have agreements requiring the terms of new contracts to be arbitrated
if not settled privately. To date, all such disputes have been settled
by collective bargaining.105 The experience of the railroads under
Public Law 88-108106 also indicates that compulsory arbitration and
collective bargaining can coexist. An arbitration board acting under
this enactment established a series of guidelines to be used by the
parties in connection with the size of train and yard crews. The
parties were first to seek a settlement by negotiation; if that failed,
the disputes were to be referred to local arbitration boards. The railroads reported that 111 agreements were reached by bargaining under
this procedure in a two-year period. 107 In addition, an authoritative
study of compulsory arbitration for public utilities in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania concluded that "bargaining relationships which
were functioning success£ully before the enactment of the laws were
not greatly disrupted by the statutes."108
Another prevalent misconception is that compulsory arbitration
is pro-management. However, management traditionally has not
only refused to seek compulsory arbitration, but has actively opposed it.109 As one student of the labor movement noted, "arbitration
rem~ins the recourse sought by the party which judges itself the
104. For the experience under the RLA, see Goulard Statement 14. See also Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 n.15 (1967).
105. Goulard Statement 14.
106. 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
107. Statement by the Association of American Railroads Before ABA Special
Committee on National Strikes in the Transportation Industries, May 3, 1967, at 17.
108. R. FRANCE & R. LEsTER., supra note 132, at 87.
109. The National Association of Manufacturers' Subcommittee on Emergency
Disputes of the Industrial Relations Committee has recently taken a strong position
against compulsory arbitration. BIG LABOR AND BIG STRIKES: ANALYSIS AND RECOM·
MENDATI0NS 11-12 (undated pamphlet). In his article, Mr. Rosenman said:
Opposition to compulsory arbitration has come with equal intensity from widely
diverse ends of the political and economic spectrum. The subject has made as
incredible a set of bedfellows as can be imagined: Wayne Morse and Barry
Goldwater; the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers.
113 CONG. REc. A3609 (daily ed. July 18, 1967).
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weaker side in a labor dispute." 110 The changing positions of labor
and management in the transportation industry support this statement. During the early days of union organization, the railroads
were in the ascendancy and opposed compulsory arbitration. The
unions, then on the weaker side, generally favored it. Many spokesmen for labor testified in favor of compulsory arbitration at the
hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in
1883. The Knights of Labor, with a membership of 67,000 the most
powerful labor organization during the 1880's, had a preamble of
organization setting forth as one of its primary purposes "[t]he substitution of arbitration for strikes, whenever and wherever employers
and employees are willing to meet on equitable grounds."m Today,
after a turnabout in the relative bargaining strength of labor and
management in the transportation industry, positions on compulsory
arbitration have been reversed-railroads favor compulsory arbitration, as do several airlines, and the unions are opposed. One reason
for this change of position is that transportation "is the industry least equipped to withstand a strike."112 The imbalance in bargaining power is caused by the nature of transportation: output cannot be inventoried or stockpiled, demand cannot be deferred, licensed employees cannot be replaced, and partial operations cannot
be conducted.113 Another distinction is that the lockout, one of management's primary weapons in other industries, is unavailable to
transportation management because of public service considerations.114
Thus, the arguments of labor and management on the issue of
compulsory arbitration reveal more about their relative power positions than about correct principle. With the disparity in bargaining
power that exists in transportation, muscle has become the ultimate
determinant-at the expense of collective bargaining. 115 The unions
110. Pitzele, Book Review, 8 LABoR HISTORY 101, 102 (1967).
111. SENATE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT UPON nu: RELATIONS BE·
TWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR 2 (1885). See also E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR
ARBITRATION 6-10 (1952).
.
112. Statement by Samuel I. Rosenman in Hearings on S. 176 Before Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 16 (1967).
113. Goulard Statement 7-8.
114. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See also Michaelson v. United
States, 291 F. 940, 944 (7th Cir. 1923) reu'd on other grounds, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). Cf.
Brotherhood of Ry. &: S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 245 (1966).
115. Collective bargaining is premised upon equality of bargaining power. See Cox,
The Duty To Bargain in Goad Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403-09; G. TAYLOR,
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF lNDUSTIUAL RELATIONS (1948).
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argue against compulsory arbitration because they seek to retain the
advantage which their muscle confers. From the standpoint of the
public, however, an assertion that settlements engendered by sheer
muscle are productive of economic wisdom is no less ludicrous than
the medieval assumption that trial by battle was productive of moral
wisdom.
Despite all this, the political opposition which a compulsory
arbitration proposal would engender from the unions may well be
overwhelming.116
F. Arsenal of Weapons
The "arsenal of weapons," or choice-of-procedures, proposal
stems from a desire to maintain the flexibility which ad hoc legislation provides while avoiding the undesirable side effects of such
legislation. 117 The premise is that all of the possible techniques for
resolving a dispute are known or knowable in advance. Therefore,
would it not be desirable for Congress to forearm a specialized agency
to apply the most appropriate of these techniques in individual cases?
The use of the techniques or procedures authorized by arsenal of
weapons legislation would be discretionary. Some of the weapons
would be distasteful. But a doctor preparing to go out on an emergency call packs his bag full of instruments and medicines not because he expects to use all of them, but because he wants to be
prepared to provide whatever treatment is needed without going
back to his office. Hopefully, some of the procedures in the arsenal
of weapons, like the castor oil in the doctor's bag, will not be needed.
When they are needed, however, failure to use them could produce
even more unpleasant consequences. Indeed, one of the arguments
in favor of the arsenal of weapons approach is that the presence of
distasteful alternatives will induce the parties to bargain rather than
risk their application.118
The RLA already provides part of an effective arsenal of weapons.
One of the weapons is the emergency board, whose appointment by
116. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 803, 810 (1967).
117. Adlai Stevenson was among the earliest and most eloquent advocates of the
choice of procedures approach: "Congress should give to the President, a choice of
procedure when voluntary agreement proves impossible: seizure provisions geared to
the circumstances; or arbitration; or a detailed hearing and a recommendation of
settlement terms; or a return of the dispute to the parties." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1959,
at 51, col. 2. See also Wirtz, The "Choice.-of,Procedures" Approach to National Emergency Disputes, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES ,\1'1D Ni\TIONAL POLICY 149-65 (1955).
IIB. See Raskin, Collision Cot1rse on the Labor Front, SAT. REV., Feb. 25, 1967, at
32, 70.
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the President is largely discretionary. Some contend that the probable appointment of an emergency board in certain types of disputes merely defers bargaining. 119 Undoubtedly this is true when
the emergency board's recommendations can be ignored with impunity by one party or the other. However, if the emergency board's
powers were strengthened, the parties might be induced to bargain
to avoid undesirable alternatives. 120

III. A

PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
EMERGENCY BOARDS

As shown above, recent experience has not confirmed the original expectation of labor and management that acceptance of emergency board recommendations would be virtually mandatory. The
refusal of unions to accept these recommendations reflects labor's
commanding bargaining power rather than its dissatisfaction with
the composition of presidential boards. Emergency board members
have generally been disinterested, distinguished, capable, and expert
in the process of collective bargaining-characteristics relied upon
in the proposal for permanent reform set forth below. Under this
proposal, the responsibility for determining whether a dispute-or
any part of it-should be submitted to arbitration would be transferred from Congress to the emergency boards. In deciding whether
a dispute should be arbitrated, the emergency board would be
guided by two important criteria: the effect of the threatened strike
on the public and the prospect for settlement by collective bargaining. If an emergency board were to determine that a dispute should
be arbitrated, the parties would be given a reasonable period of time
to agree upon acceptable arbitrators and procedures. If the parties
should fail to do so, the emergency board itself would prescribe the
terms of arbitration. Thus, it should be possible to restore emergency boards to the effectiveness originally contemplated, and to
eliminate what has been described as one-sided compulsory arbitra119. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 810.
120. In addition, several miscellaneous proposals deserve some consideration. The
restructuring of collective bargaining, continuous bargaining, and peace and harmony
committees-while desirable-do not solve the underlying problem of protecting the
public in those cases when such procedures simply do not work. "Nonstoppage
strikes" would be unfair to one side or other unless the penalties are in exact equilibrium-which is a practical impossibility. Making unions subject to the antitrust
laws seems to offer little hope of reducing transportation strikes; because of the
nature of transportation, a relatively small group of employees can shut down an
entire system. Indeed, one might be tempted to conclude that undue proliferation of
unions is one of the major problems in transportation.
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tion in which the carriers, regulated by the government, are virtually
compelled to accept emergency board recommendations which the
unions can ignore with impunity. 121
One advantage of this proposal is that issues not susceptible to
collective bargaining could be sorted out so that the proper functioning of bargaining on other issues would not be impaired. An
example of such an issue is the airline crew complement dispute.
That dispute was not really a labor-management controversy at all,
but a work assignment and jurisdictional conflict bet1veen t1V'o competing unions. The pilot and flight engineer unions each argued
that, from the standpoint of safety, it should have the third seat on
jet aircraft.122 To expect collective bargaining to resolve this kind of
dispute is to expect too much, since a concession to one union would
bring only increased antagonism from the other. The crew complement dispute sired a "feather-bird"-an unneeded additional crew
member on jet aircraft. 123 Despite the settlement efforts of ten emergency boards,124 the controversy produced thirteen airline strikes
totalling 510 days125 and upset collective bargaining relationships for
a period of years. Had the emergency boards been given the authority
proposed herein, their participation in the dispute would have been
more meaningful and collective bargaining would not have been
hampered by the stresses and strains engendered by conflict over a
nonbargainable issue.
Collective bargaining also fails to function well in settling issues
involving technological change. The complexities of a proposed
technological change may not be fully understood, or the change in
the nature of jobs may threaten traditional bargaining relationships.
As demonstrated by the railroad work rules dispute, a union threat121. In Hearings on S.J. Res. 81 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. II9-20 (1967), J. E. Wolfe,
Chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference, testified:
I remember not too long ago when Arthur Goldberg was Secretary of Labor
we had an Emergency Board recommendation that the carriers felt could hardly
be accepted without almost ruinous results. We called on the Secretary. I remember his words. "It would be intolerable for the railroads to refuse to accept these
recommendations.'' And we knew it would be intolerable. We knew pretty well
what the outcome would be. It would not only be intolerable, it would be extremely unpleasant. We accepted the recommendations.
So we have what is tantamount to finality as far as we are concerned, but
absolutely nothing where the unions are concerned.
122. See Feinsinger Commission Report, May 24, 1961, at 22.
123. Jacobs, Dead Horse and the Featherbird-The Specter of Useless Work,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1962, at 47.
124. See the Reports of Emergency Boards, No. 120, No. 121, No. 123, No. 124
(1958), No. 135, No. 136, No. 142, No. 143 (1961), No. 144, No. 146 (1962) and the two
Feinsinger Commission Reports of May 24, 1961 and Oct. 17, 1961.
125. See Goulard Statement 26-27.
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ened with extinction or a substantial loss of membership is unlikely
to agree to a technological improvement, even though guaranteed
liberal benefits for individual employees.126 Still, the public interest
requires that technological improvement not be subject to a veto
by a powerful union.121
Other factors which have caused collective bargaining to falter
too often, particularly when there is an imbalance of bargaining
power, are the personalities, competence, or ambitions of the individuals at the bargaining table. As a prominent labor specialist
observed, "There is usually one key individual on each side of the
bargaining table, and the nature of the given negotiations depends
largely on the character of these individuals and on what is motivating them at the time." 128 Incompetence poses special threats to
the bargaining process. As one commentator stated:
People need licenses to drive a taxicab, practice medicine, install
plumbing or crop corns. Yet I have watched labor-management
negotiators, who ought not to be allowed to cross the street without
a seeing-eye dog, inflict hardship on millions of their fellow-citizens
through sheer incompetence at the bargaining table-and there is
not one thing anyone in the community can do to arrest them for
reckless use of a dangerous economic weapon. No remotest relationship exists between the capacity or social responsibility of the bargainers and the degree of damage their status enables them to visit
on the economy.129

Whenever such impediments to collective bargaining threaten to
inflict more injury on the public than on the parties, the emergency
board-under this proposal-would be able to step into the bargaining process.
This proposal also allows an emergency board considerable flexibility to determine what action short of arbitration should be used
to bring about agreement benveen the parties. Thus, intransigence
on either side during the bargaining process could be countered by
the board's power to call in a referee in the name of the public.
This discretionary power would certainly strengthen the board's
ability to mediate a dispute.130
The fact that the RLA applies to a limited part of the economy
126. See Landis, The Dynamics of Emergency Disputes, in LABOR LAw DE1967: PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE THIRTEENTH .ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW
209, 213 (1967).
127. See 'Wisehart, Comment, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 92, at 37.
128. D. Cole, THE QUEST FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE 9 (1963).
129. Raskin, Collective Bargaining and the Public Interest, in CHAI.LENGFS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 155 (1967).
130. Seidman, supra note 92, at 491.
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makes it possible to adopt this proposal without affecting the general
practice of collective bargaining. All that is involved is a change in
the locus of determination from Congress to the emergency board;
the flexibility of being able to tailor the action taken to fit each dispute would be preserved. Such a change would restore to emergency
boards the status originally intended, give collective bargaining a
last chance by strengthening mediation, and place in the hands of
disinterested experts the delicate question of whether the nature of
the dispute and the public interest are such as to require third-party
determination.

